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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
affect commerce directly.15 Mining coal to be shipped in commerce is not
intimate to that commerce.' 6 But there is a close and substantial connection
between commerce and producing steel from outstate materials to be shipped
outstate.17 Nor is commerce only remotely affected bv the activities of men
making heavy repairs on locomotives which may haul interstate trains. 8
The news, as part of commerce, is directly affected by employing a rewrite
editor working locally within a state.19 There is a close and substantial
relationship between warehousemen handling fruit which will be shipped
in commerce and commerce itself.20 The production of a local utility com-
pany which supplies power to carriers in interstate as well as intrastate
commerce bears more than a mediate, indirect, and relatively remote rela-
tionship to interstate commerce.21 Grading and inspection of tobacco to be
sold for interstate commerce bears an immediate relation to that com-
merce.2 2 Quotas for tobacco crops destined largely for interstate commerce
affect interstate commerce closely enough to warrant federal regulation. 23
The price which small domestice producers charge for milk sold to a whole-
saler who ships in interstate commerce is related to that commerce closely
enough to justify federal regulations. 24 It is difficult to find any common
denominator in these decisions which can be used as a criterion for what is
direct and what is not, but it would appear in the instant case that the
court in finding the act constitutional is in line with the obviously liberal25
trend reflected by these recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
W. G. P.
CoNsTiTuTIoNAL LAw-INTERGOERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY-CONORES-
SIONAL POWER TO ExTEND IMMUNITY-[United States] .- The state of Mary-
land placed a tax of one-tenth of one per cent of their amount on all mort-
gages recorded. The act creating the H. 0. L. C. exempted its "loans and
incomes" from state taxation.' The H. 0. L. C. obtained a writ of man-
damus in a state court directing the recorder to enter a mortgage held by
15. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 295 U. S. 495.
16. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 238.
17. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
(1937) 301 U. S. 1.
18. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40 (1937) 300 U. S. 515.
19. Associated Press v. N. L. R. B. (1937) 301 U. S. 103.
20. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B. (1938) 303 U. S. 453.
21. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B. (1938) 305 U. S. 197.
22. Currin v. Wallace (1939) 306 U. S. 1.
23. Mulford v. Smith (1939) 307 U. S. 38.
24. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op (1939) 59 S. Ct. 993.
25. Liberal in interpreting federal power. The present minority adheres
to the basic distinction between commerce and industry; cf. cases cited
supra, note 13. For a clear statement of this position, see Justice McRey-
nolds's excellent dissent in National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt
(1939) 306 U. S. 601, 609.
1. Home Owners' Loan Act (1933) 48 Stat. 128, 130, c. 64, 12 U. S. C. A.
sec. 1463.
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the Corporation without payment of the tax. This action was affirmed by
the Maryland Court of Appeals. It based its decision squarely on Federal
Land Bank v. Crosland,2 in which a similar tax on a Federal Land Bank
mortgage was held invalid as being a tax on a similarly exempted instru-
mentality of the federal government. But in the Crosland case the power
of Congress to make this exemption was not questioned, the decision turning
on another point.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the state in the instant case asked
that the Crosland case be overruled, arguing that the tax neither discrimi-
nated against nor placed a burden on the H.'O. L. C. so that constitutional
immunity from the tax would not be implied under Graves v. New YorkI3
and Congress cannot "grant an immunity of greater extent than the con-
stitutional immunity." 4 The Court did not answer this argument directly,
but upheld the exemption as an exercise by Congress of its power to protect
the lawful activities of its agencies.5
The whole doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity was thought by
some6 to have received a serious setback in Graves v. New York which up-
held a state income tax on the salary of an H. 0. L. C. attorney as not im-
posing "any such tangible or certain economic burden" on the Federal
Government "as would justify a court's declaring that the taxpayer is
clothed with the implied constitutional tax immunity of the government by
which he is employed."7 While it is true that certain passages in the de-
cision show impatience with the lengths to which the implied immunity of a
government from taxation has been carried in the past, and the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter goes so far as to reject the entire doc-
trine except as to discrimination or onerousness of burden in fact, the
decision in the Graves case may go no farther than to re-examine the
amount of burden on a government of a tax on the income of its employee,
and to hold that the burden is too indirect to interfere with the activity of
the government. The Court noted carefully that this was in the absence of
any express statutory exemption of the salary from taxation, and reserved
opinion on the question whether Congress might, by express action, extend
immunity beyond the limit of that implied from the constitution. The
Graves case suggested a twofold division of the field of intergovernmental
tax immunity: First, such immunity of one government or its agency s from
direct or discriminatory taxation by the other as arises out of the con-
stitution itself by implication from our dual system of government. This
2. (1922) 261 U. S. 374.
3. (1938) 306 U. S. 466.
4. Pittman v. H. 0. L. C. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 15, 18.
5. Pittman v. H. 0. L. C. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 15.
6. Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1939 Supp.) 32; Comment
(1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 143.
7. Graves v. New York (1938) 306 U. S. 466, 486.
8. This immunity is possessed only by agencies performing governmental
functions. While it is said that all agencies constitutionally created by Con-
gress perform governmental functions, with the entrance of states into
fields of private enterprise the Courts have recognized immunity only in
state agencies performing essential governmental functions. South Carolina
v. United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437.
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immunity should be strictly construed. Second, such immunity as is ex-
tended by legislative action beyond the limit implied from the constitution.
The latter immunity is not the basis of the Graves decision, and its existence
is not absolutely acknowledged by the Court.9
Pittman v. H. 0. L. C. recognizes this second basis for immunity when
it speaks of the dominant authority of Congress in the exercise of the power
to protect the lawful activities of its agencies.10 Of the cases cited by the
Court as illustrating the exercise of this power, two particularly seem to
support this conclusion.", In neither case was the tax "in form or substance
a tax upon [a government agency] or its property or income, nor is it paid
by the [agency] or the government from their funds"12 which was the test
applied in the Graves case. In each case the tax was paid by the recipient
of the benefit after it had left government control, thus making it analogous
to the situation in the Graves case with the exception that the immunity was
supported by statutory exemption.
The decision in Pittman v. H. 0. L. C. could have been reached under the
interpretation of the Graves case noted above, since there is a decisive dif-
ference between a tax on the salary of an employee of the H. 0. L. C. and a
tax on the mortgage it holds.13 This would have put the case under the
first basis for immunity and made the statute merely declaratory of an
immunity implied from the constitution.'- Such an interpretation would
avoid recognition of the immunity created by legislative action and would
thus be in keeping with the strict construction of the doctrine of inter-
governmental tax immunity in Helvering v. Gerhardt and in Graves v. New
York. Further, if the broader criticism of the entire doctrine of reciprocal
tax immunity, voiced by Holmes 15 and reaffirmed by Frankfurter' 6 should
ultimately prevail, even the result in the Pittman case might be overruled.
J. T. T.
9. But see Helvering v. Gerhardt (1937) 304 U. S. 405, n. 1, where cases
are cited as supporting legislative extension of the constitutional immunity.
10. Quaere, will the second basis for immunity apply as well to state
governmental agencies? If a strict theory of reciprocity is adhered to, this
would apparently follow. But then Congress might extend immunity to the
salary of the attorney taxed under the Graves case, and New York might
extend immunity to the salaries of employees of the Port Authority taxed
under the Gerhardt case. Thus the effect of those cases would be nullified
and a very extensive intergovernmental tax immunity restored. See Brown,
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity: Do We Need a Constitutional Amend-
ment? (1940) 25 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 153.
11. Lawrence v. Shaw (1936) 300 U. S. 245, holds valid without discus-
sion a statute exempting compensation of World War veterans deposited
in banks from state taxation; Choate v. Trapp (1911) 224 U. S. 665, up-
holds a statute exempting from state taxation land distributed to Indians.
12. Graves v. New York (1938) 306 U. S. 466, 480.
13. A tax on such mortgages reduces the return on the money loaned to
the amount of the tax and is therefore a direct, even though not a dis-
criminatory or onerous, burden on the performance of the governmental
function of lending money.
14. Under this view of the Pittman ease when taken together with the
Graves case, the cases cited supra note 11, would be subject to being over-
ruled.
15. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi (1927) 277 U. S. 218, 223 (dissent).
16. Graves v. New York (1938) 306 U. S. 466, 487.
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